

O.R.E. DRAFT - 12 August 1949

PROPOSED REVISION TO

National Security Council Intelligence Directive #1  
Policies, Duties, and Responsibilities

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following policies, duties and responsibilities will govern the conduct of U. S. Intelligence activities in support of the national security.

I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

1. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the entire governmental intelligence structure and to achieve a fully integrated U. S. intelligence effort in support of policy planning, strategic planning, and operational decisions at all appropriate levels within the government. A fully integrated intelligence effort is considered to mean that:

a. the combined intelligence production effort of CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies is continuously oriented toward concepts of U. S. national security interests in all foreign areas as established by the National Security Council.

b. the combined intelligence collection and source exploitation effort of CIA and the other intelligence agencies, effectively meets the

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requirements of the combined intelligence production effort.

c. all categories of intelligence requirements bearing on the national security are specifically identified, defined and the responsibilities for collection and production appropriately allocated throughout the governmental intelligence structure.

d. the interchange of intelligence, unevaluated information, and other information which has utility for intelligence purposes is effected between CIA and the other intelligence agencies under appropriate security provisions, and in accordance with stated requirements. While security measures must be observed, such measures should not prevent the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chiefs of the other intelligence agencies from prompt access to data required by them in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities.

2. Requirements of CIA as the intelligence facility of the National Security Council, shall receive the cooperation and support of the other intelligence agencies.

3. Departmental requirements shall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. An Intelligence Advisory Committee shall be established in order to advise the Director of Central Intelligence on matters pertaining to his responsibilities for coordinating the intelligence activities, in the interest of the national security, of the several government departments and agencies, and to maintain the relationship essential to such coordination.

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee shall consist of the following or their representatives.

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- (1) The Director of Central Intelligence who shall be Chairman thereof.
- (2) The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.
- (3) The Chief, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (4) The Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U. S. Army.
- (5) The Director of Naval Intelligence.
- (6) The Director of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force
- (7) The Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission.
- (8) The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

6. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the Chief of any other agency having functions related to the national security to sit in person or by representative with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of his agency are to be discussed.

5. To the extent authorized by Section 102 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence facilities of the various Federal Departments and Agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

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6. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and Agencies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concerned in the matter; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the National Military Establishment, the Director of Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.

7. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence organizations.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to insure full and proper implementation of Council directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the Departments and Agencies as provided in paragraph 7. Where disagreement arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one or more members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

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over such directives, the proposed directive, together with statements of non-concurrence, shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided in paragraph 6.

II. Production and Dissemination of Intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate the intelligence relating to the national security for the Executive Office of the President, the National Security Council and Staff, and for such governmental agencies or bodies as the National Security Council shall, from time to time specifically designate. Such intelligence shall be considered National Intelligence, and shall be produced for such designated agencies either separately in connection with their specific responsibilities, or collectively in connection with matters of concern to more than one department or agency.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, shall also produce:

a. intelligence in fields of common concern, which the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently produced centrally.

b. intelligence not otherwise available which is required to support CIA production and operations.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence, in so far as practicable shall avoid duplicating the intelligence activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies.

4. National intelligence not specifically exempted from the provisions of this paragraph by the National Security Council, shall, prior to publication for general dissemination, be reviewed by the appropriate

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IAC agencies for the purpose of ascertaining their views only on those aspects of national intelligence which fall within the field of their respective responsibilities. Intelligence so reviewed shall carry a statement of agency concurrence therein, or a comment which sets forth the substantial points of difference; provided, that delays in the receipt by CIA of such comments shall not bar the timely dissemination of national intelligence.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate intelligence or unevaluated information which he may have produced, or which he may possess, to other Departments or Agencies not represented on the IAC when he deems such dissemination appropriate to their functions relating to the national security, provided that such dissemination conforms to applicable security regulations of the originating agency.

6. The Director of Central Intelligence may exchange intelligence with the intelligence organizations of foreign governments in accordance with established policies governing such exchanges.

7. The intelligence files of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be made available to the other intelligence agencies under security regulations of the Director of Central Intelligence.

### III. Additional Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common concern to these Agencies as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

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2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements with the respective Departments and Agencies to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of the Department concerned.

IV. Additional Responsibilities of Other Intelligence Agencies to CIA.

1. The intelligence organizations in each of the Departments and Agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of unevaluated information and intelligence available to them. "Operational" information which has utility for intelligence purposes is included in this directive, as is information available only under special security handling restrictions. In the latter case, each intelligence organization will promptly make arrangements with the Director of Central Intelligence to make such material available to the Central Intelligence Agency under appropriate security safeguards.

2. The intelligence fields in each intelligence organization, shall be made available to the Central Intelligence Agency under security regulations of the Department or Agency concerned.

3. The departmental intelligence organizations shall provide or procure such intelligence in their fields of primary responsibility as may be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence, for Central

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Intelligence Agency's use; or that of one of the other Departments or Agencies. Within the limits of their capabilities they shall provide or procure such additional intelligence in other fields as may be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence as above.

4. In order that the Director of Central Intelligence may adequately discharge his responsibilities to the National Security Council, timely departmental action in meeting CIA commitments and deadlines is imperative. Upon specific request of the Director of Central Intelligence first priority shall be given in each departmental intelligence organization to the requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such priority shall apply to field collection action, production of departmental contributions to CIA intelligence production, and the coordination of CIA reports and estimates.

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TAB B

25X1A SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE [ ] PROPOSALS OF 2 AUGUST 1949

(NOTE: Comments are limited to specific recommendations on matters pertaining to ONE responsibilities. Comments are organized under Sections corresponding to the four [ ] proposals.)

25X1A

I COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Reference paragraph 4:

25X1A

[ ] assumes that CIA will establish an "Estimates Division" whereas CIA may arrive at a different organizational solution. If CIA does establish an "Estimates Division", its primary function would be the production of estimates. The coordination responsibility of research programs is a proper function of ONE's Programs Division, recently activated.

2. Reference paragraph 4a: Concur.

3. Reference paragraph 4b: Concur, provided he means Security regulations.

4. Reference paragraph 4c: Concur, within limits of security regulations of CIA.

5. Reference paragraph 4d: Concur.

6. Reference paragraph 4e: Non-concur on three counts: (a) CIA does not agree with the present definition of National Intelligence; (b) the allocations as presently established are so ill defined as to provide no suitable basis for action, and (c) "existing programs" are often used as a basis for denying support to CIA.

7. Reference paragraph 4f: Non-concur. This is not a "coordination" problem.

II PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Reference paragraph 1a: Non-concur. This is the fundamental point at issue. National Intelligence cannot be defined exclusively in terms of being interdepartmental in substance but must be defined in terms of the purpose for which it is produced and the levels at which it is to be used.

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2. Reference paragraph 1b: Concur. This point should be extended, however, to prohibit duplication of CIA intelligence activities by departmental intelligence agencies.
3. Reference paragraph 1c: Non-concur. This is based on the erroneous definition of National Intelligence mentioned in paragraph II 1 above.
4. Reference paragraph 2: Non-concur. This recommendation is contrary to the conclusions of the NSC with respect to the Dulles report. NSC 50 states that the Director and the IAC should not be bound by the concept of collective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned.
5. Reference paragraph 3: Non-concur. Existing procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations are adequate. (Reference DCI 3/1)

**III RESEARCH AND REPORTS**

1. Reference paragraph 1: Concur, provided that national intelligence is properly defined.
2. Reference paragraph 2: Concur.

**IV POLITICAL SUMMARIES**

1. Reference paragraph 1: Non-concur. CIA publishes National Intelligence summaries, not political summaries. The CIA summaries need more information from the service departments, not less political information from the Department of State.

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